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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

G. DALE FlAKE and CYNTHIA
R. FLAKE, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents,
vs
DUANE A. FRANDSEN,

Defendant-Appellant.

case No. 15309

APPELlANT Is BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF TEE CASE

This is a civil case wherein the Appellant appeals the
granting of Respondents' Motion for summary Judgment, and also
appeals the denial of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

This matter came before the Honorable Edward Sheya, Judge
of the seventh Judicial District court for carbon county on
Respondents' and Appellant's Motions for summary Judgment on
May 31, 1977.

The court granted Respondents' Motion and in

doing so denied Appellant's Motion.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

Appellant seeks the reversal of the lower court's action

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 2
in granting Respondents' Motion for Summary Judgment, and as:-,
this court to order the Court below to grant Appellant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Appellant has a valid common law retaining lien on the
water stock in question because he rendered professional
services for which he was not compensated, and he gained
possession of the stock in the course of providing profession,
services.
Appellant also has a statutory charging lien on the wate:
stock by virtue of his compliance with Utah Code Anno., Sec.
78-51-41 (1953 as amended), which provides for an attorney's
lien upon a Judgment procured in his client's favor and the
proceeds of the Judgment.
Thirdly, Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment should
have been granted because Respondents failed to comply with
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that a party must object to a Motion for summary

Jud~

by filing responses to it, in order to prevent the Motion frc;
being granted.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Early in 1974 Appellant's clients, Maurice and Evie May
L'Heureux, sued Ray and Maribelle Wareham over a dispute
regarding a Sales contract wherein Appellant's clients were
purchasers and Warehams were sellers.

The certificate of

water stock at issue in the present case was among the
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at issue in the Wareham suit.

Jud gment was granted in favor

of wareham by Seventh Judicial District court Judge Edward
Sheya, but later a Motion for a New Trial was granted.

Before
the new trial was heard, the parties negotiated a settlement,

and Judgment was entered on December 20, 1974, in accordance
with the terms of the settlement.

That Judgment ordered

Appellant's clients to deliver to the warehams $13,481.21
plus interest, and also ordered warehams to deliver the subject water stock, which Wareham delivered to Appellant as
attorney in the case.

Appellant's clients did not pay for the

Appellant's services in the Wareham suit, and Appellant retained possession of the water stock certificate asserting an
attorney's lien until payment of Appellant's fee of $3,000.05.
Appellant's clients then sold the farm which they had
bought from warehams to Respondents in this action.

Included

in this sale was the water stock which Appellant still held
in his possession under an attorney's lien pending compensation
for legal services rendered during the Wareham suit.
Appellant's clients moved to Missouri and have not paid
him for his legal services.

Respondents later sold the sub-

ject water stock to Utah Power and Light Company.

Utah Power

and Light paid for the stock and then demanded possession.
Appellant declined to deliver the stock to Utah Power
and Light, and has at all times maintained possession of it
and asserted an attorney's lien pending payment for legal
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services

Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
services rendered.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 4
Respondents filed suit against Ap

t
an on January 7,
1977, seeking to compel delivery of the stock.
Appellant
pe

11

moved to dismiss on the ground that Respondents were not real
parties in interest as required by Rule 17(a) of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure, having sold the stock t
and Light, and having been paid therefore.

o Utah PO\oier

The Motion was

denied.
Appellant then filed an Answer alleging that Respondents
were not real parties in interest, that Respondents had failec
to join

Appellant's former clients as indispensible parties,

and asserting an attorney's lien on the stock.

On April 25,

1977, Respondent moved for Summary Judgment and filed a sup~~
ing affidavit.
On May 6, 1977, Appellant filed an objection to Respondet[
Motion for Summary Judgment as required by Rule 56(e) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and also moved for Summary
Judgment in his favor, with a supporting affidavit.

Responden:

did not file any counter-affidavits and did not respond to
Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment, other than by oral
argument at the hearing.
on June 2, 1977, the lower court granted Respondents'
Motion for summary Judgment, and in so doing denied Appellant.
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Appellant now petitions the Uta:.

supreme court to reverse the lower court and order the
of Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
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ARGUMENT

POINT l
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING
RESPONDE.tr.;S' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING~
APPELlANT S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BECAUSE NO
MATERIAL FACT WAS AT ISSUE AS TO APPELLANT's COMMC>N IAW
RETAINING LIEN ON THE WATER STOCK CERTIFICATE IN HIS
POSSESSION.
It is well established within the law that attorney's
liens are divided into retaining liens, founded upon possession,
and charging liens, founded upon a Judgment.

It is stated

in 3 A.L.R. 2d at page 148:

"Attorneys' liens are divided, according to their nature,
into two classes: (l) general, possessory, or retaining
liensr and (2) charging or special liens. The forme~.
which is generally a common law lien, attaches to all
property, papers, books, documents, securities, and moneys
of the client coming into the hands of the attorney in
the course of his professional employment, and gives him
the right to retain possession thereof as security for
costs, disbursements, and charges not only in the particular cause in which they come into his possession, but
for all costs, disbursements, and charges due him for
other professional employment and business. This lien
is, however, generally speaking, a passive one, and cannot
ordinarily be actively enforced either at law or in equity.
The special or charging lien, on the other hand, which
is one given to the attorney for his services rendered
in procuring a Judgment, Decree, or award for his client,
may be actively enforced in appropriate proceedings
therefore."
It is clear then that for a retaining lien to exist the
client must owe the attorney for legal services or other business charges and the attorney must have in his possession
some "property, papers, documents, securities" etc. which belong
to the client, and which came into the attorney's possession
in the
course of professional employment. These tests are
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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plainly met in the instant case.

Appellant provided valuable

legal services for his client in the litigation wJ.'th
'i'lareham and was not compensated therefore.

Mr.

&

MJ:,

And the subject

water stock, belonging to the client, came into Appellant's
possession in the course of professional employment, namely
in accordance with the settlement and Judgment in the >vareh

~

suit.

The leading Utah case on retaining liens is Midvale Motor,
--.......:

Inc. vs Saunders 21 tJ;2d 181, 442 P. 2d 938 ( 1968) .

In that cas;

the plaintiff lost at the trial level, but on appeal Judgment
was reversed.

Thereafter difficulties developed between the

plaintiff and its attorney and the attorney withdrew.

The at.

torney then asserted a charging lien on the files, pleadings
and the property involved in the law suit pursuant to Utah
Anno. Sec. 78-51-41, 1953 as amended.
chargL~g

coce(
I

In holding that no

lien existed because the attorney had not procured

a Judgment in his client's favor as required by the statute,
the Utah Supreme Court '"'as careful to point out that a retain·
ing lien may still exist even though the statutory requirements
for a charging lien had not been met.
Speaking for an unanimous court, Mr. Justice Ellett

sta~ec

"The court D:lelow). attempted to declare a lien when the
statute tu.C.A. 78-51-413 gave none. If counsel was
justified in withdrawing ~rom the.case he had a ;ammon
law retaining lien and stJ.ll has J.t • . • but he nas no
charging lien on plaintiff's property" . 442 P. 2d at
940 {emphasis added)

Thus it is clear that Utah, like most states, has a commin
Sponsored
by the S.J. Quinney Law
Library.separate
Funding for digitization
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by the Institute
of Museum and Library
law
retaining
lien
from
and
independent
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charging lien.

The Court realized that to rule otherwise

would be to hold that an attorney has no remedy at all against
the client who refuses to compensate him for services rendered,
unless a Judgment is obtained.

Such a holding would leave

the attorney defenseless with regard to services rendered
other than in actual litigation.

For many attorneys most of

their time is spent in advising clients in matters which do
not involve litigation or Judgments.

Estate planning, advising

businesses, conducting real estate transactions and drafting
contracts are just a few of many examples of vital and frequent
attorney functions which do not necessarily involve litigation
and Judgments.

The attorney certainly must have recourse to

a retaining lien in these situations if a client fails to pay.
In fact one of the very purposes of a retaining lien is to
provide a remedy against unjust enrichment in those cases where
a charging lien does not apply.
It is equally clear that it is

~terial

that someone

other than the original client is seeking to deprive Appellant
of his lien in this case.

It is well settled in most juris-

dictions that the mere attempted transfer of rights in the
subject property by the client to a third party cannot serve
to extinquish retaining liens altogether because they are
possessory in nature and all a client would have to do to defraud
his attorney would be to sell or give the subject property
away whenever the attorney sought reimbursement for valuable
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
services.
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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As early as 1927 Oklahoma faced th'~s issue in ~
~, 252 P. 834 (Okla. 1927).
In that case an attorney ~s
hired to recover 160 acres of ~is client's land.

Before Judg.

ment was rendered the client secretly compromised with the
adverse party and conveyed the property to him.

The Oklahoma

Supreme Court held that the attorney retained his lien on the
~

property for services rendered, dispite the attempted conve~~
Likewise, Appellant in the present case has a valid retain~g
lien on the water stock which was not extinguished by Respond,
purchase of the same.

The lien continues until the attorney

has given up possession or until he has been compensated for
his services.
It is also clear that the stock in question in this case
is the type of property which is subject to a common law re·
taining lien.

It is stated in 3 A.L. R. 2d at p. 148 as quote(

above that retaining liens attach to "all property, papers,
books, documents, securities, and moneys corning into the i'lands
of the attorney in the course of his professional employment,"
In 7 c.J.S. Attorney and Client Sec. 210 at 1141 it is stated

that retaining liens are an attorney's right to retain posses·
sian of "all documents, money, or other property of :'lis client
coming into his hands professionally."
While not distinguishing between a retaing lien and a
charging lien Clark et a 1 vs 0 ' Donne 11 , 187

.o.

::34 (colo.

J

l92C~

is illustrative of the majority rule that such attorney's

liens appiy not only to pleadings and other papers actoallY
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drafted by the attorney, but also t

th
o o er property, securities
or certificates of stock belonging to t:1e client but in the
possession of the attorney.

In that case the attorney was

retained to enforce a Sales Contract by which his client had
bOught 700,000 shares of stock in the Mexico-wyoming Petroleum
company.

The attorney was successful and the court delivered

the stock to the attorney for the sole purpose of transferring
it to his client.

Upon the client's refusal to compensate

the attorney, the attorney asserted a lien and was upheld by
the colorado Supreme court.
Likewise, in the instant case, Appellant asserts a retaining lien upon the water stock belonging to his client and which
came into Appellant's possession in the course of professional
employment, namely the stock certificate and other documents which
were delivered upon the payment of the money to Narehai:IS in
satisfaction of the Judgment in the Wareham case.
Further it is well settled in Utah that a Motion for
summary Judgment must be granted where the pleadings, even if

proved, would not provide a basis for recovery.

Rule 56(c)

of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states in part:
"The Judgment sought shall be rendered fortlT..rith 1£ the
pleadings, depositions, answer to interrogatives, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to Summary
Judgment as a matter of law."

An analysis of the Respondents' pleadings shows that
there are no genuine issues of material fact which would bar
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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merely alleges that the Respondents p

h
d
urc ase the stock afte:
it came into Appellant's possession as a result
of the Juo'3lne
ill the Wareham suit. Assuming such to be true, a
common law
retaining lien takes precedence over t'
b
ne su sequent purchaser
as a matter of law. To preserve the attorney• s interest in t
property in his possess ion is the very function of the rata~;
lien.
The affidavit in support of Respondents' Motion for

Swmnary Judgment merely alleges that Respondents paid for the
water stock, instructed Appellant to deliver possession, t~t
Respondents desire to sell the stock, that Appellant was
plaintiff • s attorney ill the Wareham suit and that there was n

1

Judgment rendered in his clients' favor.

Even if Respondents

affidavit were to be taken as factually correct in all respec:
Appellant would still be entitled to Summary Judgment as a
matter of law because the common law retaining lien does not
rest upon a Judgment.

Appellant has a common law retaining

lien in the water stock as long as he retains possession

~d

remains unpaid for services he rendered to his client.
POINT 2
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING
RESPONDENTS ' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING
APPEL!AJ.'lT' S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT, BECAUSE NO
MATERIAL FACT WAS AT ISSUE AS TO APPELlANT' S STATUTORY
CHARGING LIEN ON TEE WATER STOCK CERTIFICATE IN HIS
POSSESSION.

At common law the attorney's special or charging
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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an equitable right to have the fees
services in a suit secured to him

d
an costs due to him for

out of the Judgment or

recovery in that particular suit.
The lien is based on the principle

f
o equity that plaintiff should not be allowed to appropriate the whole of a Judgment in his favor without paying thereout for the services of
his attorney in obtaining such Judgment.

The charging lien

binds the award or Judgment which has been obtained through
the attorney's efforts, and prevents a client from receiving
the fruits of his attorney's labors without compensating him
for his services.
For this common law charging lien to exist there must
have been unpaid attorney's fees for legal services rendered
in that particular cause of action, a Judgment, and appropriate notice.

If these elements were present, a lien attached

to the cause of action.

However, this common law charging

lien has been replaced by Utah Code Anno., Sec. 78-51-41 (1953
as amended), which reads in full as follows:
"The compensation of an attorney and counselor for his
services is governed by agreement, express or implied,
which is not restrained by law. From the commencement
of an action, or the service of an Answer containing
a counterclaim, the attorney who appears for a party
has a lien upon his client's cause of action or Countercla~, which attaches to a verdict, report, decision, or
Judgment in his client's favor and to the proceeds thereof
in whosoever hands they may come, and cannot be affected
by any settlement between the parties before or after
Judgment."
Several things are clear from the above statutory language.
First,
itLawisLibrary.
readily
apparent
theof statute
only
Sponsored by
the S.J. Quinney
Funding for digitization
providedtnat
by the Institute
Museum and Library
Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Page 12
applies to services performed in litigation.
...
The statute
says, ''From commencement of an action, or the
service of an
Answer containing a Counterclaim, the attorney . . . has a
lien . •

This language indicates that Utah, like most

states, has codified its charging lien but remains silent as
to the common law retaining lien.

It is Ap pe 11ant' S POSitior.

that this statute does not exclude the other type of common
law attorney's lien, namely the common law retaining lien.
Second, the statute only protects plaintiff's attorneys,
and defendant's attorneys who have filed Counterclaims.

This

further narrowing of the statutory charging lien argues even
more strongly for the retention of the common law retaining
lien to protect attorneys who represent clients in capacities
other than in litigation or where the litigant is a defendant
not asserting a Counterclaim.

It is also clear that Appellan:

is protected by the statute in spite of the narrow language
because he represented the plaintiff in the Wareham suit.
Third, the statutory charging lien attaches to "verdict,
report, decision or -1\ldgment in his Ithe attorney' sl client's
favor and the proceeds thereof."

For the statute to apply

the attorney must have obtained a Judgment in his client's
favor.

That Appellant did so here is clear.

It is at this

point that the present case diverges from tile Midvale Motors
case, supra.

In that case the plaintiff lost at the trial,

and then the Judgment was reversed on appeal.

It was immediat:1

after that reversal that difficulties arose and the attorney

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Wi thdrew from the case.

The co urt reasoned that the attorney

had left his client as he had found him, with a lawsuit yet
to be tried, and that therefore there was no Judgment to which
a charging lien could attach.

The relevant language from the

court's opinion is as follows:
"The statute t78-Sl-4ll gives a lien to the attorney
on the fruits of his labor so as to protect him against
an unjust enrichment on the part of a nonpaying client.
It is not intended to give a general lien on any other
assets of the client. If the attorney's work is sterile
and produces no fruit, then he has no lien. Here counsel
for plaintiff produced no fruit from his labor. He lost
the case in the court below and then had to labor on an
appeal to put his client back in status quo. When he
withdrew from the case, he left the plaintiff practically
as he found it, viz., with a lawsuit yet to be tried."
442 P.2d at p. 940.
contrast the Midvale Motors case with what happened in the
present case.

Here the court rendered a JUdgment against the

plaintiff and then granted a Motion for a New Trial upon certain
issues.

If the scenario had stopped there, this case would have

:oeen similar to Midvale Motors.

But here Appellant took the

additional step of negotiating a settlement to the satisfaction
of his client which made the new trial unnecessary.

The fruits

of this settlement were included in the final Judgment, giving
to the plaintiff, among other things, the water stock at issue
here, in exchange for the stipulated price.
Thus it is clear that Appellant went beyond the facts of
Midvale Motors and obtained, by a successful Motion for N~w
Trial and by favorable negotiation, a Judgment favorable in
part to his client.

The water stock is the fruit of that
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Utah statute, as well as being subJ·ect to the
retaining lien.

common law

That such a holding complies with the

behind this statutory lien is also clear.

policy

Mr. Justice Ellett

in the above quoted language illuminates that statutory

Pur.
It is to protect the attorney against unjust enrichmen:

pose.

on the part of the nonpaying client.

As a direct result of

Appellant's professional services, his client received title
to certain land, livestock, and water stock at issue here.
To allow the client to sell the proceeds of that Judgment
without compensating Appellant for his legal services would
clearly amount to unjust enrichment.
The last phrase of the charging lien statute resolves
another issue.

The statute is unequivical in its affect on t:;

present case, namely, that the lien continues in the stock,

1

notwithstanding the fact that the Appellant's client attemptec I
to transfer ownership.
1rhe~

The language is as follows:

lien. . • attaches to the proceeds !Of the Judgmentl

in whosoever hands they may come. . . "

The express mandate

0:

the statute is that an attempted assignment or sale of the
proceeds of a Judgment cannot defeat an attorney's charging ll!
At common law appropriate notice was necessary, but the Utah
Legislature saw fit to dispense with that requirement.

This

same conclusion has been reached by other state courts which
have interpreted similar statutes.

In Anderson vs Star-Bair

Oil co. et al, 243 P. 394 (Wyo. 1926), the Wyoming court held
Sponsored
the S.J.
Quinney Law Library. Funding
digitization
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tands was superio~ to the rights of

an assignee, even without

notice.
In City of Los Angeles vs Knapp et al, 60 P.2d 127 (calif.
1936) the California Court reached the same conclusion. In
that case the city attempted to condemn certain property, and
then abandoned the attempt.

The Court awarded costs and

attorney's fees to the defendant, who assigned his rights to
a third party.

Defendant's attorney later assigned his rights

to another party, and the Court held that the interest of the
attorney's assignee was superior to that of the client's
assignee.
The Arizona Court followed the same reasoning in Linder
vs Lewis, Roca, Scoville and Beuchamp et al, 85 Ariz. 118,
333 P.2d 286 (1958).

The relevant facts are as follows:

Louis Marches hired attorney Harold Scoville to sue Jack
Tolmachoff for malicious prosecution.

Scoville won. a Judgment

in the amount of $15,000.00, which Judgment Marches assigned

to attorney Milton Linder for collection.

Linder received

payment in full and assigned it to Grace Thomas.

The Arizona

supreme court held that Scoville had a-charging lien superior
to Linder or Thomas because the attorney's interest, "as the
person helping create the fund is paramount and superior to
the rights of other persons."

333 P.2d at 289.

Such is the

majority rule and in accord with public policy.

It would be

sheer folly to enact a statute for protection against unjust
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Appellant has a statutory charging lien on the

water stc:
as proceeds of the Judgment he received as a result of the
trial and his negotiations, in accord
lien statute.

·
ance W:J..th the Utah Charg;

The only way such a lien can be lost is by

waiver or estoppel.

Lundy vs Cappuccio, 181 P. 165 (Utah

1:

19
It is clear that Appellant's Motion for Summary Jud9lllent

should have been granted because Respondents' pleadings raise
no genuine issues as to any material fact.

As discussed above

the original Complaint merely alleges that Respondents purcha:
the subject stock after it came into Appellant's possession by
order of the Court in the Wareham suit.

Respondents' affidav:

in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment alleges that

Respondents paid for the stock and instructed Appellant to
deliver possession, that Respondents desired to sell the stock;
and that there was no Judgment in the plaintiff's favor in
the Wareham suit.

The only allegation affecting the validit1

of a statutory charging lien is the last one regarding a
favorable Judgment.

In spite of the language in paragraph one

of the decree wherein the Court awards Judgment against the
plaintiffs, examination of paragraph two reveals that in retu::
for the amount stipulated, the defendants were ordered to conv:
to the plaintiff the subject water stock, as well as
land and livestock.

certa~

Certainly this Judgment was favorable in

part to Appellant's client, ordering the defendant-vendor to
deliver the very subject matter of both that suit and the
present
one
toLaw the
plaintiff-vendee.
It ofis
clear
then
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the favorableness of the Judgment in the wareham suit is not
a genuine issue.
itS very face.

The final Judgment resolves the question on
Therefore there are no genuine issues of fact

alleged by Respondents which would bar the grandng of Appellant's
Motion for Summary Judgment, regarding the existence of a statutory charging lien.

Appellant's statutory charging lien at-

tached to the Wareham

cause of action and to the Judgment

rendered, favorable in part to Appellant's clients, the plaintiffs.
said lien also attaches to the water stock as proceeds of the
Judgment in whosoever hands that stock may come.

Thus Appellant • s

statutory charging lien would have been valid against the stock
even if Appellant had relinquished possession.
Appellant also has a common law retaining lien on the water
stock in his possession.

That the charging lien statute

was not intended to supplant the common law retaining lien is
obvious from an examination of the consequences of such a
holding.

The charging lien statute has been narrowly drafted

to protect only litigants' attorneys who make affirmative
pleadings, as discussed above, and such lien attaches only to
Judgment etc. from that litigation.

If that were the exclusive

protection an attorney had, he would have to render most of his
services without the availability of recourse to an attorney's
lien to prevent unjust enrichment on the part of an unpaying
client.

It is for this reason that this Court was careful to

preserve the retaining lien in Midvale Motors discussed above.
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likewise decided that their resPective h
c. arging lien statut
do not affect retaining liens at common law.

e.

See 120 A.L.R,

at p. 1247.
POINT 3
THE LOWER COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN GRANTING
RESPONDEN'7S ' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN DENYING
APPELLANT S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMEm', BECAUSE RESPONDENTS FAILED TO RESPOND TO APPELI.A.."'T' 'S MOTION FOR
SUMM.ARY JUDGMENT AS REQUIRED BY RULE 56(e) OF THE tJTAa
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
Appellant is entitled to Summary Judgment because the
Respondents failed to answer Appellant's Motion for Summary
Judgment.

Rule 56(e) of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provic:

in part as follows:
"When a Motion for Summary Judgment is made and supporte:
as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest
upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleading, bu:
his response, by affidavits or as otherwise provided in
this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If he does not so
respond, Summary Judgment, if appropriate, shall be ente:
against him."
The rule specifically provides that an adverse party
must respond to a Motion for Summary Judgment, or else Summar,
Judgment must be entered against him.

It is not enough to

rest upon pleadings made up to the filing of the Motion fqr
Summary Judgment.

The Motion for Summary Judgment itself mus:

be confronted and specifically dealt with.

The Eighth circuit faced this issue in Jacobson vs Maryla:.
casualty co. 336 F.2d 72 (1964).

Maryland as surety filed
·

· d ~lY
't I

the byaction
losses
allegedly
on and
certa~n
~n
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agreements insuring Jacobson's perfo~~-ce of
tracts.

~u .... ,
government conIn Februa~z 1960, Maryland requested admissions,

and in June 1960, Jacobson filed an Answer.

Maryland moved

for Summary Judgment in October 1960, supporting its Motion with
"Suggestions in Support" and in February of 1961 Jacobson filed
an amended Answer and an affirmative defense.

Ma.-yland's

Motion for Summary Judgment was granted in part in March 1961,
and in October of 1962, Jacobson moved for summary Judgment,
with "Suggestions in Support", which Motion was denied in
December 1962, at which time Judgment was rendered in favor
of Maryland.
The EighthCircuit reversed the Judgment, holding that
Maryland had never answered Jacobson's affirmative defense
asserted in February of 1961.

In discussing Rule 56(e) of

the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, -..rhich is identical to
utah's Rule 56(e), the Court stated:
"Maryland also contends that the assertions made in
support of its Motion must be taken as true but ma~es
no counter assertions with respect to Jacobson's
affirmative defense. The assertions in the Motion
are meaningless unless supported as provided for in
Rule 56(e) • True, the moving party may pierce the
counter allegations contained in his opponent's pleadings, but in order to do so, he must discharge his
burden and show by extraneous material that there is
no triable issue of fact although one superficially
appears from the pleadings. The record ~s devoid ~f
anything contravening Jacobson's allegat~on of aff~rm
ative defense. It was not Jacobson's obligation,
but Maryland's, to produce the necessary extraneous
material to expose this defense as unmerited.
In,spite of the protracted pleadings, requests for admissions,
andSponsored
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to Jacobson's affirmative defense was

necessary, and

was reversed for lack of such a specific response.

Jud~

:.ouent

so a~o

in the present case, Appellant set forth an attorney's lien

as an affirmative defense in his Answer and again asserted
said lien in his affidavit in support of his Motion for
Judgment.

5~

Respondents' sole confrontation came in Resnond
•

affidavit in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment
prior to Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

ent;

, mac.

In that

affidavit Respondents merely assert that Appellant did not
obtain a Judgment in his client's favor in the Wareham suit,
a contrary conclusion to which is indisputable upon the vecy
face of said Judgment.

Furthermore, this assertion came

~

Appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment and therefore cannot
be considered a response to said Motion as required by Rule

S6(e}, and the assertion does not controvert Appellant's
common law retaining lien in any way.
Rule 56(e) demands a specific response to an opponent's
Motion for Summary Judgment, and Respondents have failed to
make any response whatsoever.

Absent such a response the

Motion must be granted, unless a 56(£) affidavit is filed
stating that the party cannot respond to the Motion and settiDS,
forth specifc reasons therefore.

No such affidavit was filed:

the present case.
In Kaz Manufacturing co. vs Chesebrough-Pond' s Inc., 211
F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y., 1962) the Court states:
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"The proponent of a Motion for s
the burden of satisfying the Cou~tJ~?gmeni has
~~=s~~~~:; di~~ute as 1to q~estions of fa~~r~ai=e~oby
the obli atio
nverse y, tne opponent to prevail has
issues
rel~v~tsi~~=l~ ~dllprFecsisely r8alising triable
•
. upp.
5 at 820.
In other words, the opponent to a Motion for summary

oi

JUdgment has the burden of "squarely and prec i se 1y " setting
forth material facts which are at issue.

If every fact in

Respondents' pleadings were taken as true, a retaining lien
would still exist, and there would be no material fact at
issue.
Even if Responden~had responded to Appellant's Motion
for Summary Judgment, it is nevertheless clear from the
wareham Judgment that the favorableness to Appellant's clients
of paragraph 2 of that Judgment is not a genuine issue of fact,
and therefore Respondents have not responded to Appellant's
charging lien defense.
A similar interpretation of Rule 56(e) was reached in
Gates vs Ford Motor co. 494 F.2d 458 (lOth Cir., 1974).

In

that case defendant moved for Summary Judgment where plaintiff
had alleged that defendant's faulty design of its tractor was
the cause of its overturning and killing plaintiff's husband.
Plaintiff did not establish breach of duty, and in discussing
the propriety of Summary Judgment, the Court said,
"Disposition of this case by Summary Judgment also is
proper under Rule 56(e). Appellee supported its Motion
for sunnnary Judgment with documents. Under the circumstances, the party opposing the M~ion may not rest upon
the mere allegations of his plead~ng but must respond
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with specific facts showing a genuine J.'ssue f
Appe llant, ,nowever, failed to do this." 494 or trial ·
F. 2d at 46C.
Respondents moved for SIJIIl!Ilary Judgment on April 25,
.
1977

and Appellant responded with written objections on May 6 ,
.
197
in compliance with Rule 56(e). Appellant also moved for Sul!i·
mary Judgment in his favor on May 6th, thus obligating R

esP<lnc

ents to comply with Rule 56(e) and specifically confront Ap.
pellant's Motion for Summary Judgment.
pleadings and affidavits are

Respondents' prior

insufficient~

an objection to

Appellant's Motion is required.
Respondents failed to file any type of answer to
Motion, and, in accordance with Rule 56(e):

Appella.~:

"If he does not

so respond, Summary Jqdgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against him."
Clearly summary Judgment is appropriate in this case
because of Respondents' failure to raise any genuine issues

as to material facts regarding the validity of a common law
retaining lien and a statutory charging lien.

Therefore

Respondents failed to comply with Rule 56(e) and Summary
Judgment in Appellant's favor must be granted.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Appellant has done all within his power

~d

all necessary not only to create a common law retaining lien,
but also to comply with the charging lien statute.

He has

'i

retained possession of "property, documents, securities, papers
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valuable legal services.
ing lien.

He therefore has a common law retain-

In addition, he has a charging lien under Utah Code

Anno., Sec. 78-51-41 (1953 as amended).

The water stock is

proceeds of the Judgment directing the defendant in the wareham
case to convey that stock to Appellant's client.

As

the plain-

tiff's attorney in the Wareham suit, Appellant had a lien on
the cause of action, which lien attached to the Judgment
rendered, and the water stock as proceeds thereof.
Examination of plaintiffs_' pleadings and affidavits show
that a lien would be attached to the water stock even if all
the pleadings and affidavits were true.

Therefore, Appellant

is entitled to Summary Judgment as a matter of law.

Also,

Respondents failed to respond to Appellant's Motion for Sum-

mary Judgment, as required by Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of
civil Procedure, thus requiring that Appellant's Motion be
granted.
Appellant prays that the granting of Respondents' Motion
for summary JUdgment be reversed as improvidently granted
and that the lower Court be directed to enter summary Judgment
in favor of the Appellant.
DATED

this

/

~?-t(:

day of September, 1977.
Respectfully submitted,
MICHAEL R. JENSEN
Frandsen, Keller & Jensen
Professional Building
90 West lst North
Price, Utah 84501
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that the foregoing Appellant's Brief

was served on counsel for the Respondents, Boyd Bunnell by
delivering three (3)

copies thereof to his office at Oliveto

Building, Price, Utah 64501 on the__~~----~day of September,
1977.

I
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

